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Abstract It should not be a surprise in the near future to
encounter either a personal or a professional service robot
in our homes and/or our work places: according to the
International Federation for Robots, there will be approx 35
million service robots at work by 2018. Given that indi-
viduals will interact and even cooperate with these service
robots, their design and development demand ethical
attention. With this in mind I suggest the use of an
approach for incorporating ethics into the design process of
robots known as Care Centered Value Sensitive Design
(CCVSD). Although this approach was originally and
intentionally designed for the healthcare domain, the aim
of this paper is to present a preliminary study of how
personal and professional service robots might also be
evaluated using the CCVSD approach. The normative
foundations for CCVSD come from its reliance on the care
ethics tradition and in particular the use of care practices
for: (1) structuring the analysis and, (2) determining the
values of ethical import. To apply CCVSD outside of
healthcare one must show that the robot has been integrated
into a care practice. Accordingly, the practice into which
the robot is to be used must be assessed and shown to meet
the conditions of a care practice. By investigating the
foundations of the approach I hope to show why it may be
applicable for service robots and further to give examples
of current robot prototypes that can and cannot be evalu-
ated using CCVSD.
Keywords Robot ethics  Care ethics  Value-sensitive
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Introduction
In previous works I have argued in favor of a robust
proactive framework for incorporating ethics into the
design and implementation of robots named the Care
Centered Value Sensitive Design (CCVSD) approach (van
Wynsberghe 2012, 2013, 2015). This approach to design,
to date, has been targeted at the design and implemen-
tation of care robots—robots used in a healthcare context
to assist the nurse in his/her role—with the goal of
explicitly and systematically including ethics into the
design process of these robots. The approach is intended
to help robot designers and ethicists in both the retro-
spective ethical evaluation of care robot design as well as
the prospective design of future care robots. Through a
series of steps for analyzing care practices (involving data
collection, analysis and comparisons), the researcher is
able to make an ethically grounded judgment concerning
the design of a care robot that has the potential to con-
tribute to good care.
Although robots in healthcare are a main area of
development in robotics at the time of this paper (2016),
according to the International Federation for Robotics
(IFR), more than 4.7 million service robots were sold for
personal and domestic use in 2014, including a 542 percent
increase in assistive robots for the elderly and disabled.1
There will be approx 35 million service robots at work by
2018. A service robot is a robot which ‘‘performs useful
tasks for humans or equipment excluding industrial
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automation application.’’2 Although healthcare robots fall
within this definition, robots in other sectors like education,
agriculture, policing, etc. have been and are currently being
designed and implemented. Given these numbers one
would estimate that a framework for the evaluation of
robots in these sectors exists and is in testing at the
moment. One would be wrong.
The CCVSD approach was originally, and intentionally,
designed for the healthcare domain and seemed a natural fit
given the already present role that care ethics plays in
healthcare (Tronto 2010) and the inherently ethical context
of nurses and doctors caring for patients. However, given
the lack of a robust approach for robots in other domains
one may wonder whether or not the same or a similar,
comprehensive and systematic approach for incorporating
ethics in care robot design can be applied to robots in other
sectors. Such an approach is surely needed in virtue of the
increasing role robots will play in our daily lives—at home,
at work, and for play. This would be a welcome addition to
the fields of robotics and robot ethics. I take the first steps
in addressing this challenge in this paper and set the stage
for the use of the CCVSD approach towards service robots
both personal and professional. This approach fits into the
study of robot ethics in that it appeals to the ethics not of
the robots themselves (as machine ethics would have us
consider) but to the ethics of the designers, users, regula-
tors, and policy makers.
I begin by discussing what service robots are and why
they deserve, and even demand, ethical attention. Follow-
ing this I will present the CCVSD approach briefly for the
reader. Afterwards I explore why the CCVSD approach can
be used for service robots. In short, I suggest that the
CCVSD approach can be used when a service robot is
integrated into a care practice. In this paper, I present two
necessary conditions for labeling a care practice as such.
Given that the CCVSD approach relies on the concept of a
care practice for its normative grounding, if these two
conditions are met then the CCVSD approach ought to be
used for evaluating the robot. The two conditions are as
follows: (1) that the care practice is a response to the needs
of another and (2) that the needs of the other are met
through reciprocal interaction between the care giver and
care receiver. If these two conditions are not met then the
robot should not be normatively evaluated using the
CCVSD approach. Using examples of current robot pro-
totypes I will show why certain robots should or should not
be evaluated using the CCVSD approach. To be clear, this
paper is not meant as an exhaustive evaluation of different
service robots as that will come in the future. Rather, this
paper is meant to present a case for the use of the CCVSD
approach outside of the healthcare domain.
Service robots: what and why?
According to the IFR between the years 2014 and 2018
there will be approx 35,000,000 personal service robots in
use worldwide.3 This is no small number. This number
adds weight to the idea that robots in the homes and
workplaces of people are no longer fuel for our imagina-
tions or science fiction writers; rather, robots will soon
greet us at the store, direct us to what we want to buy,
check us out at the register, clean our floors while we are
away, and read our kids a bedtime story.
As there is no universal definition of a robot it is also
difficult to give a universal definition of a service robot.
Service robots can have a range of capabilities (e.g. loco-
motion, infrared sensing), degrees of autonomy (e.g.
amount of input from a human operator for the robot to
fulfill its task), and appearances (e.g. creature like, machine
like, humanoid) (Engelberger 1989). What the IFR,
scholars, and roboticists can all agree on is that service
robots function outside of the factory setting and in this
way they are distinguished from industrial robots (Engel-
berger 1989; Lin et al. 2011; Veruggio and Operto 2006).
For the IFR a service robot is: ‘‘a robot that performs useful
tasks for humans or equipment excluding industrial
automation application.’’4 Service robots are then further
classified as personal service robots, functioning in the
homes of people, or professional service robots, function-
ing in a professional context for commercial use. For the
former, examples include home cleaning robots (e.g.
Roomba), or the latest Jibo5 (advertised to be the newest
member of the family), and for the latter fall surveillance
robots (e.g. Knightscope robot6), delivery robots (also
referred to as logistic robotics7), robots to greet customers
(e.g. Oshbot), and cleaning and disinfection robots (e.g. the
UV disinfection robot8). An often neglected area of pro-
fessional service robots are those in farming and agricul-
ture. Sales in these areas are rising with little attention to
the ways in which these robots change farming practices.
Examples of such robots include but are not limited to:
robots for milking cows (Driessen and Heutinck 2015), for
crop maintenance (Evert et al. 2006), and for weeding
(Pedersen et al. 2006).
This new context of functioning means that the robots
must be able to co-exist, and even cooperate, with humans
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humans live, work, and play in. To do this most often the
robots must be embedded with a certain degree of artificial
intelligence, e.g. machine learning, autonomy, advanced
sensing etc. It is precisely this elevated level of intelligence
added to the inclusion of robots into ethical contexts that
presents society with a need to address the ethical issues
related to these robots. In other words, society must con-
sider that ethics with regards to these robots is not only
about what happens when the robot is present and we must
co-exist with such a technology—these are the questions
that we constantly face as any new device enters our per-
sonal domain. Rather, it is about what happens when a
technology can make decisions on our behalf as these
robots most certainly will. What does it mean to delegate
such a role to the robot? What does it mean to be in a
relationship with such a technology (note that when I say
be in a relationship I do not mean a romantic one; rather a
relationship with the technology in which it takes on a vital
role in our lives)?
There are many different layers of ethical issues to be
discussed (Asaro 2006; Capurro 2009; Lin et al. 2011).
There are fundamental issues such as: robot responsibility
(Lokhorst and van den Hoven 2011; Sullins 2011; W.
Wallach 2010), human responsibility (Allen and Wallach
2011; Asaro 2006; Wallach and Allen 2008), liability
(Asaro 2011), agency (Sullins 2011; Wallach and Allen
2008), and well being (Sharkey 2014; Sharkey and Sharkey
2012; Sparrow and Sparrow 2006). There are also more
applied ethical issues such as the potential impact on:
privacy (Calo 2011; Denning et al. 2009), security (Den-
ning et al. 2009), and so on. All of these issues must be
dealt with; the only dilemma is when, how, and by whom?
Service robots touch on all of the ethical issues specified
above. They are being designed to take over roles and
responsibilities in a wide range of practices in our lives.
There are ongoing studies attempting to understand what
makes people trust, become emotionally attached to, and
socialize with robots. Trusting, emotional attachment, and
socializing are all ethically charged words—words we
usually use in connection with other moral agents. Although
I have doubts about whether a robot can be a moral agent,
the appearance of moral agency is enough to warrant eth-
ical evaluation. Furthermore, these robots are being placed
into contexts in which they are responsible for children
(educational robots and social robots) (Sharkey 2016), our
grandparents (Sharkey and Sharkey 2012), and other vul-
nerable demographics. These contexts are, like healthcare,
inherently ethical. For these two reasons (that robots are
being built with at least the appearance of moral agency and
that they are being placed into inherently ethical contexts),
service robots demand ethical evaluation and reflection.
We do not want a situation in which society must deal
with these issues in a piecemeal manner after the
technology has become pervasive much like smart phones
or online social networking sites today. Rather, we should
put ourselves in a position in which ethical issues are
identified and dealt with at an earlier stage in development
during which time there may even be an opportunity to
mitigate these concerns. The important question becomes
how this can be achieved? I propose it is the robot ethicist
who is tasked with the responsibility of finding a solution
and the CCVSD approach, as will be argued in this paper,
is a great place for a robot ethicist to start.
The care centered value sensitive design approach
The CCVSD approach brings together two traditions;
Value Sensitive Design (VSD) and the care ethics per-
spective. These two traditions are brought together to
answer the question: how can values be included in the
design of (care) robots and which values ought to be
included?
VSD is an approach to the design of computer systems
that takes values of ethical and social impact into consid-
eration throughout the design process (Friedman 1996;
Friedman et al. 2002, 2003, 2015; Friedman and Kahn
2003; Spiekermann, 2015). The CCVSD approach is not a
contradiction to VSD. It is an answer to the criticism that
the values in VSD lack a normative foundation (Manders-
Huits 2011). Care ethics, with its care values, is used to
answer this challenge by providing a normative grounding
to VSD theory and methods. More importantly, the
CCVSD approach provides a systematic manner in which
the methods of VSD can be carried out (i.e. through the
steps of data collection and analysis that I later describe).
CCVSD is just one way to provide normative grounding to
VSD. One could, in principle, provide such grounding
using another ethical theory like deontology or conse-
quentialism. Therefore, VSD remains an important theory
on its own. However, as argued elsewhere (Manders-Huits
2011), in ethical contexts there must be a normative
grounding for the values which VSD is being used to
promote.
For the purpose of this paper it is important to describe a
focal point of the approach, the Care Centered framework
(see Fig. 1), and its method of use. For an extensive the-
oretical account and justification of this framework along
with the CCVSD approach please see previous publications
(van Wynsberghe 2012, 2013, 2015).
I speak of the framework and its method of use as being
two separate things because the framework can be used in
either a retrospective or a prospective manner. The way in
which it is used in either case is similar but with differences
in the: target audience, stage of development, and impact
on the future design and/or implementation. For instance, if
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the ethical evaluation is done at a later stage in develop-
ment only little tweaks here and there, in the hardware or
software, may be possible whereas if the evaluation is done
earlier on the entire interface or level of robot autonomy
may be altered.
To use the framework, i.e. the methodology of the
CCVSD approach, the ethicist and roboticist engage in a
series of steps: data collection, value analyses, scenario
comparisons, and recommendations based on the scenario
comparisons. An outline of these steps is presented in
Table 1. Note, however, that although these steps are
presented in a linear fashion it is possible that they may be
iterative depending on the stage of development and the
needs of the design team, for example a team may com-
plete steps 1–6 then return and complete steps 3–6 again
with a new prototype. I must acknowledge that the design
process is organic and thus there must be flexibility to go
back to a previous step if necessary. In due time one would
imagine that engaging in these steps and envisioning the
future robot in its context of use before the prototype is
made will ultimately reduce the number of prototypes
made to meet the needs of the care practice in an ethical
manner.
The ethics of the CCVSD approach
I focus now on the ethical underpinning of the CCVSD
approach as it plays a crucial role in the conditions for
using the CCVSD approach which I will later present here
in this paper. As I have stated earlier, the ethical tradition
that serves as the normative foundation for this approach is
care ethics. This tradition is neither consequentialist (i.e.
the consequences of an action determine if it is right/
wrong) nor deontological (i.e. adhering to a duty determi-
nes if an action is right/wrong). In fact care ethicists claim
that the goal of care ethics is not to fit the traditional mold
of either of these theories (Little 1998; Noddings 2002;
Tronto 1993, 2010; Verkerk 2001). Instead, care ethics
presents different elements that act as a starting point for
uncovering and exploring a moral dilemma. Central to
these elements are: relationships, roles, and responsibilities
(Tronto 2010). In particular, the reciprocal nature of a
relationship is highlighted which facilitates an active,
rather than a passive, role of the care receiver (Ibid). From
this standpoint then, the ethical dimension of the CC
framework, and the CCVSD approach overall, is not to
focus entirely on the consequences of the robot’s actions
nor to focus on certain duties that the engineer must abide
by, or the robot must adhere to; rather, the approach echoes
the care ethics perspective in that it focuses on promoting
values inherent in the relationships, roles, and responsi-
bilities of the practice at hand. Most importantly, it focuses
on the relational nature of care activities.
What’s more, care ethics argues that roles, relationships
and responsibilities mark the starting point for the ethical
analysis (rather than providing an equation or the like for
solving an ethical dilemma). Accordingly, I suggest that
the CC framework act as a starting point for identifying the
ethical issues relevant to the robot in question. From the
starting point of roles, relationships and responsibilities,
both the consequences and duties must be weighed to come
to an answer about the right thing to do, i.e. what is
right/good.
Also of interest is that care ethics shares a likeness with
the virtue ethics tradition in that there is a focus on char-
acter development. Of course this point may be contested if
you consider that care ethics is relational at its roots rather
than individual agent-based like virtue ethics (Noddings
2002); however, when we consider that the caring agent
must fulfill both the caring action with a caring disposition
we may suggest that care ethics is concerned not only with
actions but also with character development (Tronto 1993;
Vallor 2011). As such care ethics pays tribute to how a
good care giver comes to be known as such, i.e. what is the
good care giver, what are the characteristics he/she must
embody and how does one arrive at becoming a good care
giver? Consequently, the ethical nature of a situation in
which a robot is involved is not entirely action based but
must also pay tribute to how the robot contributes to, or
hinders, the development of an individual as a good care
giver. Thus, the ethical dimension of the robot, its goodness
or badness, is not entirely based on how it may increase
efficiency (i.e. consequence driven) or protect the privacy
of users (i.e. duty driven) but also on how it will impact the
ethical character development of users (e.g. will it have a
long term effect of causing users to objectify other
humans?).
Care ethics, and the CCVSD approach, in relying on
care values and the relationship between care giver and
care receiver was obviously suited to the healthcare
Context – hospital (and ward) vs. nursing home vs. home setting… 
Practice – lifting vs. bathing vs. feeding vs. delivery of food and/or sheets, social interaction, playing games… 
Actors involved – nurse and patient and robot vs. patient and robot vs. nurse and robot… 
Type of robot – assistive vs. enabling vs. replacement… 
Manifestation of moral elements - Attentiveness, responsibility, competence, responsiveness 
Fig. 1 The care centered
framework for the ethical
evaluation of robots
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context; however, I will show below that caring extends
beyond the hospital—and, therefore, so does the CCVSD
approach. Saying that the CCVSD approach can be
used beyond the context of healthcare is unhelpful if
there is no clear signs that a given context or practice
involves care. In the next section I bring to light
conditions that must be met in order for a robot to be
considered to be a part of a care practice, and in so
doing delineate under what conditions the CCVSD
approach is applicable.
Table 1 Steps of the CCVSD methodology
Step What Happens and How
1. Data collection of care practice prior to the robot The researcher uses the components of the framework to paint a picture of the care
practice by visiting the context in which the practice occurs and researching
relevant literature [i.e. a thick description according to the nature of activities
approach (for more on this see Sio and Wynsberghe 2015)]. This is done prior to the
robot’s introduction
2. Value Analysis of care practice prior to the robot to
create a scenario for comparison
The researcher describes in great detail how the care values are manifest in the care
practice as well as who has what role and responsibility. The researcher must also
have an understanding of how the practice is linked with other practices and with an
overall process, e.g. the practice of picking vegetables is linked with another
practice of harvesting and/or crop maintenance and is also linked with the overall
process of managing a farm
The practice is not described in idealistic or utopic terms; rather, the practice is
described as it occurs in reality at the time of description. Therefore, the practice is
then open to criticism and scrutiny. In this way it is possible to observe when and
how a robot may be a welcome, or necessary, addition to the practice for ensuring
good care
3. Data collection of robot The robot is described in terms of its capabilities and appearance, e.g. the robot has a
machine-like appearance, the robot is capable of autonomous travel throughout a
building but requires human input to complete its task, or the robot can complete its
task without any input from a human operator
If this step is done without a robot prototype in production it is possible that at this
point the design team speculates on the kinds of capabilities and appearance the
robot ought to have based on the results of the above two steps
4. Value analysis of the practice with the robot
introduced to create a scenario for comparison
The same practice is then described, in as much detail as it was originally described
in step 1 (i.e. according to the CC framework), only this time once the robot has
been integrated. To do this it is optimal for the researcher to visit the context of use
to observe the robot in its intended context of use
Oftentimes this is not possible as the robot may still be in an early prototype phase
(and as such considered an emerging technology); however, it is still possible to
provide a detailed description of the care practice given the way in which the robot
is intended to be used
It is also possible that at this step there may be more than one robot prototype to enter
the practice. Each of these prototypes ought to be integrated into a separate scenario
to show the differing results to the resulting care practice
5. Scenario comparison At this point one has an elaborate picture of the care practice, in terms of the
manifestation of values, before the robot has been introduced and following the
robot’s inclusion. With this information one can now compare analyses according
to the impact on: the distribution of roles and responsibilities, the impact on
human–human relationships, the generation of new human-robot interactions, and
the impact on the care values (either positive or negative)
If there are multiple robot prototypes each of these scenarios will be compared with
the scenario of the care practice prior to the robot’s inclusion. If there is only one
robot prototype then there ought to be two scenarios for inclusion
6. Recommendations for design, re-design,
implementation, and/or policy
Depending on the stage of development, the analysis can yield recommendations for
different stakeholders. If the analysis is done earlier on in the design process
recommendations can be used to steer future prototypes
If the evaluation is done later on recommendations may be used to steer
implementation and policy to regulate the robot
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The applicability of the CCVSD approach outside
of healthcare
As mentioned earlier, CCVSD brings together two
approaches: the design approach of VSD for incorporating
values in the design process and care ethics for normatively
grounding the values used to evaluate the robot. The hurdle
for this paper is not to show how VSD can be used outside
of healthcare as its aim is in fact to be used in multiple and
varying contexts. The hurdle is also not to show that care
ethics can be used outside of healthcare as care ethicist
Joan Tronto has already dedicated an entire book to this
question (Tronto, 1993). The aim is to show that the
CCVSD approach can be used for the design and evalua-
tion of robots outside of healthcare contexts.
I will show that the CCVSD approach can be used in
such cases if the robot in question meets certain conditions.
The conditions I will arrive at are inherent to the normative
foundation of the approach, namely that of care ethics.
These conditions are also necessary within healthcare
contexts and were implicit in my previous evaluations of
care robots; however, because healthcare contexts so often
meet these conditions, there was no need to spell them out
explicitly. Given that the CCVSD approach revolves around
the concept of a care practice for its normative grounding
(i.e. for structuring the selection of values and the way in
which values can be analyzed), the conditions for using
CCVSD result from the conditions for labeling a care
practice as such. To arrive at further conditions I take a
closer look at the details and requirements of a care practice.
Condition #1: Care practices as a response to needs
Care practices are a concept used in the care ethics tradi-
tion to distinguish between caring activities and other types
of activities. To label a practice as a care practice demands
that one recognize the interrelatedness of: (1) the com-
passion and empathy required to care for another, (2) the
thought that goes into understanding what can be done to
care for one in need, and (3) the action to realize the
practice of caring. By conceptualizing care practices in this
way the aim is to view care as a complex and multi-layered
activity rather than exclusively as an emotion or principle
(Tronto 1993).
The most comprehensive articulation of a care practice,
in this author’s opinion, is that which is provided by Tronto
in which she identifies stages and corresponding moral
elements. The stages are as follows: ‘‘caring about’’ (rec-
ognizing a need for care), ‘‘caring for’’ (taking responsi-
bility to meet that need), ‘‘care giving’’ (the actual physical
work of providing are), and ‘‘care receiving’’ (the evalua-
tion of how well the care provided has met the caring need)
(Tronto 1993). The moral elements serve as a means for
evaluating each of the stages and correspond to the four
stages: attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and
reciprocity respectively. For more information on a care
practice please see Tronto (1993) and van Wynsberghe
(2012, 2015).
The CCVSD approach relies on the concept of a care
practice for its normative grounding in two ways: (1) It
uses the stages of a care practice as the means of sketching
the distribution of roles and responsibilities within the
caring activity, and (2) It uses the moral elements of a care
practice as the values of ethical importance (according to
the requirements of VSD) to be included in the design of
future care robots or to be used to evaluate the ethical
nature of a current robot.
There are certain conditions necessary in order to label a
care practice as such versus labeling it just a practice/ac-
tivity (e.g. playing a sport or cooking a meal). First, care
practices are considered a response to the needs of another.
It is not the goal of this paper to restrict myself to one
definition of a need but instead to highlight central features
which serve as necessary conditions of the concept of
‘need’ from the care ethics perspective. It is helpful to
distinguish needs from wants. Although we desire both, a
need is something which is necessary for survival or well-
being (Tronto 1993; van Wynsberghe 2015). Without a
need one is lacking something preventing them from sur-
viving or being well. A want that goes unfulfilled will not
prevent one from surviving or being well. For example, one
needs water in order to survive but one wants beer and will
survive and be well without it. Although a thorough con-
ceptual analysis of need is outside the scope of this paper,
we can say, at the very least, that a need is something that
without which one cannot be well or cannot survive. This
leaves a lot of room for argument regarding what people
need in order to be well—an argument to be had by
competing theories of well being–which is precisely
something for roboticists and robot ethicists to argue.
Many scholars have attempted to classify needs in dif-
ferent ways. The Psychologist Abraham Maslow developed
a hierarchy of needs that typified, categorized and priori-
tized needs (Maslow 1970). According to this categoriza-
tion, people moved from one type to another as their needs
were being met. This presented a linear fashion to under-
stand how needs can be met and how the more fundamental
needs for survival must be met before any others. Many
care ethicists would argue for a more particularistic vision
of needs (Mol et al. 2010; Tronto 2010; Vanlaere and
Gastmans 2011). Accordingly, ‘needs’ ought to be con-
sidered as individualistic in so far as they are related to the
person as a unique multi-dimensional person, e.g. the high
school student Sarah will have different needs from the
University student Laura (Vanlaere and Gastmans 2011).
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Moreover, needs are not only specific to the individual but
can change from one moment (year, month, day, hour,
minute) to the next thereby giving needs a dynamic char-
acter, e.g. the elementary student Sarah will have different
needs from the high school student Sarah (Mol et al. 2010).
In fact, for Tronto ‘‘any agency or institution that presumes
that needs are fixed is likely to be mistaken and to inflict
harm in trying to meet such needs (Tronto 2010 pg. 164).
Recognizing this individualistic and dynamic character of
needs is pivotal for care ethics as it brings to light the
active role of the care receiver in the care process—he/she
must convey this to the care giver. This active role adds
weight to the relational nature of care. In other words,
because needs are particular and changing, care is not an
activity bestowed on an individual without consideration
for how it is received (uni-directional); rather, it is an
activity (or series of activities) that two parties participate
in with intention (it is bi-directional).
For Tronto (1993), every species (human and animal) is
in a state of need at some point in their life and more often
than not at multiple points in their life. Think of children or
elderly persons in need of assistance with bathing, dressing,
or mobility to function in their daily lives. Consider ani-
mals such as cows in need of being milked. This univer-
sality of needs lends itself to the idea that care is not
restricted to the healthcare domain but is an inevitable fact
of life; being in need and being cared for are conditions,
that for humans at least, are necessary for being alive.
The first condition for labeling a care practice as such is
that the practice must be a response to the needs of another.
This is not to say that a condition for using CCVSD is that
the (service) robot itself is responding to the needs of a care
receiver; rather, it could be that the robot contributes to
how a human or other technology responds to needs.
Examples of robots contributing to the meeting of needs
include: a feeding robot that responds to the need of an
individual to eat, or a disinfecting robot responding to the
needs of a pharmaceutical factory to be sterile and so on.
An example of a robot that does not meet this description is
a bar tending robot.
Condition #2: The reciprocal nature of needs
Because we have not restricted ourselves in the definition
of need (in that I have not taken a stand regarding a theory
of well-being) we may take needs to be broadly construed
to include things such as entertainment or sexual inter-
course—provided that these are included by one’s pre-
ferred theory of well-being. The sex robot or the
entertainment robot can then be considered as devices
responding to needs. But as we have seen above it is the
way in which these needs are met that bears significance.
Because needs are individual and dynamic the care practice
too is individual and dynamic which in turn reinforces the
need for reciprocity within the care practice. Thus, needs
must be met through a reciprocal interaction between the
one providing relief (the care giver) and one in need (the
care receiver). The dancing robot that merely dances for an
audience is not engaged in a care practice in which it is
paying attention to, or responding to, the needs of its
audience in a reciprocal manner. Instead, the dancing robot
performs its activity without concern for the particular
needs of audience members (i.e. in a uni-directional
manner).
In contrast to the dancing robot, a personal service robot
for entertaining in the home which plays games with the
human user is a different case. Such a robot interacts and
responds to the actions of its user. Of greater interest is that
such a robot could even be programmed to learn the
behaviors of its users and ultimately become a partner in a
reciprocal interaction. We will return to this idea later on
(‘‘Enter the robot’’ section).
What can we make of the disinfection robot mentioned
above (in ‘‘Service roborts: what and why’’ section) with
this vision of reciprocity in mind? It is true that the robot
responds to a general need for sterility in the factory but it
does so by taking cues from its environment (the air
quality) in a passive manner; meaning, the environment
does not act with intention to indicate its state of function. I
would suggest that this is not in fact a reciprocal interaction
and further that intention on the part of the care receiver is
a necessary condition to consider that a reciprocal inter-
action has or is taking place.9
To expand further on this idea of intentionality on the
part of the care receiver, think about a robot for picking
vegetables. While it is true that the robot interacts with its
environment we cannot say that the cucumber or tomato to
be picked acts with intentionality to indicate to the robot
that it is ripe and ready to be picked or that it must be left in
the ground or on the vine. A second condition of labeling a
care practice as such, in addition to it being a response to
needs, is that: the entity in need of care acts with inten-
tionality to engage in the reciprocal relationship.
A consequence of this is that although a technology may
be considered in need of repair the activity of repairing the
technology cannot be considered a care practice. It may
indeed be considered a practice in which skill is exercised
and a change of function occurs (i.e. the technology goes
from broken to fixed/functioning); however, the practice is
not one of care because the technology does not act with
intention with its care giver.
9 Tronto (1993) also claims that technologies may at times be in need
and require care but I would disagree with her for this very point—
intention on the part of the care-giver and care-receiver is necessary
for a reciprocal interaction and the technology cannot provide this.
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What does this condition mean for the person in a coma
or the infant? Both of these individuals are in need of care
and are of course deserving of care but cannot interact with
their care giver with intention to indicate whether their
needs are met. This is not to say that such individuals were
not at one time capable or will not be capable of such in the
future; rather, that at that moment in time they are not
capable of this kind of interaction. True, the person in a
coma may exhibit a change in function and the infant may
cease crying when fed but these reactions are quite dif-
ferent from an active care receiver who will knowingly tell
its care giver they have had enough to eat or that they need
to go to the bathroom and would like assistance with this.
Again I repeat this does not mean that such individuals are
not in need or deserving of care but rather that they are not
capable at that moment in their life of a reciprocal inter-
action as I am defining here.
If we consider what such an interaction might look like
with a robot, consider the way in which cows interact with the
milkbot: the cow walks to where the milkbot resides to have
itself milked by the robot. The cow, the care receiver, acts
with intentionality to have its need (e.g. relief from swelling
in its milk glands) met. The robot, the care giver, responds to
the actions of the cow and in so doing meets its need.
Thus the second condition of a care practice is that the
care receiver and care giver engage with intention in a
reciprocal interaction to meet the needs of the care recei-
ver. This reciprocity is essential for understanding the
multi-layered needs of the care giver as well as their
changing dynamic. It requires that the care receiver play an
active role in the meeting of their own needs.
From this we may then ascertain certain practices for
which the CCVSD may not be applicable. Consider the
practices of weeding on a farm, vacuuming the floor, or
assembling parts on an assembly line in a factory. The
practice of weeding before any discussion of a robot occurs
between a human weeder and the plant to be picked or
pruned. Given that the plant to be picked or pruned is not
capable of engaging in a reciprocal interaction with its care
giver, the weeder, it is not possible to consider this a care
practice. The cleaner that vacuums or mops the floor does
not do so in a reciprocal manner with the floor. The floor
can show a change in state, i.e. it appears clean after being
mopped, but conveying this change of state or discussing
its nature is not an intentional choice on the part of the
floor. For the person working on the assembly line we may
call this a practice for which it can be evaluated as good or
bad and for which an interaction takes place between the
person working the line and the parts he/she is working
with; however, once again we cannot claim that the parts
on the assembly line are capable of interacting in a recip-
rocal manner as has been outlined in this paper. True we
may call all of these practices in which skills are developed
and for which they may be evaluated as good or bad;
however, provided that they do not meet the conditions we
cannot call them care practices as such.
In the same vein, one may be hard pressed to show how
a surveillance robot is integrated into a care practice when
the original surveyor (the human security guard) was
interacting with the environment around and not neces-
sarily people. One can also think about a window washing
robot; the practice for which the robot is being used orig-
inally occurred between the window washer and the win-
dow and although we may rightly refer to it as a practice it
should not be considered a care practice.
Enter the robot
We have now arrived at two necessary conditions for
labeling a care practice as such and it is a care practice that a
robot must be involved in, in order to use the CCVSD for its
evaluation. As we go further in our investigation of using
CCVSD we will observe that the robot is involved in the
meeting of needs as an actor but may not be solely
responsible for doing so, i.e. the robot may enhance the
ability of a human care giver to meet the needs of a care
receiver by increasing the capability for the human care
giver to be attentive or competent. Of particular interest will
be the impact the robot bears on the element of reciprocity.
With this in mind there are various scenarios that we
will then encounter, related explicitly to reciprocity, once a
robot enters the care practice:
(i) The robot enters into a care practice in which the
reciprocal relationship happens between two
humans (or a human and an animal) and the robot
does not diminish this interaction,
(ii) The robot enters into a care practice in which the
reciprocal relationship happens between two
humans (or a human and an animal) and the robot
enhances the ability for reciprocity between
actors,
(iii) The robot enters into a care practice in which the
reciprocal relationship happens between two
humans (or a human and an animal) and the robot
impedes, threatens, or abolishes the reciprocity
between actors, and,
(iv) The robot enters into a care practice in which the
reciprocal relationship happens between two
humans (or a human and an animal) and the robot
then becomes engaged in a reciprocal interaction
with the human.
Each of these scenarios presents a picture in which a
robot may be involved with the reciprocal aspect of the care
interaction. To begin, it is possible that the robot will not
have an impact on the reciprocal interaction between care
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giver and care receiver (i), for example a robot used to
deliver materials throughout an office building. If we con-
sider the robot to be integrated into the practice of delivery
in which a care receiver can request certain materials to be
delivered and the care giver (the person delivering items).
When the robot is integrated the person in need (the care
receiver) will still make requests to the care giver only now
the materials will be delivered by the robot. If the use of the
robot enhances efficiency of the office it may be considered
an enhancement (ii); however, in many cases it will not
have a direct impact on the reciprocal interaction between
the original care giver and care receiver.
In cases of scenario (ii), consider any number of telepres-
ence robots used to help maintain contact between employees
and their employers when geographical distances separate the
two. The care practice is considered the interaction between
employee and employer for their daily activities, a need in
order for the company to function, and the robot is used to
enhance this interaction by enhancing the type (e.g. quality
and or quantity) of communication between persons.
For scenario (iii), one might imagine the care practice of
serving tables. The care giver, the server, and the care
receiver, the customer, are engaged in a reciprocal inter-
action for the course of the meal. When a robot enters this
care practice it may replace the server entirely thereby
abolishing the reciprocal interaction between the server and
customer. Alternatively, there may be instances in which
the robot enters the care practice in a way that enhances the
speed and/or efficiency with which the customer and server
(or chef) can communicate (i.e. scenario ii).
Scenario (iv) presents a picture of what may happen in the
future when the robot is embedded with enough artificial
intelligence (AI) to be deemed capable of a level of atten-
tiveness and competence for ascertaining when needs are
changing as well as how to respond to these changing needs.
In this way the robot may be considered a reciprocal partner
for the care receiver. This presents the most interesting case
to apply the CCVSD approach to and will be the task of
future work when such robots begin to enter the market.
Consider the same server robot in the paragraph above; if it
were endowed with enough AI to engage in a reciprocal
interaction with customers the scenario may be categorized
as iv. Determining whether or not any of these scenarios are
good or bad will be decided on a robot-by-robot basis when
one follows the steps of the CCVSD approach (see Table 1).
Evaluating and designing service robots using
CCVSD
In the above section my aim was to show that the CCVSD
approach requires that certain conditions are met in order to
make a retrospective evaluation. These conditions are
derived from the conditions for labeling a care practice as
such and are: (1) That the practice be a response to the
needs of another and, (2) That the care giver and care
receiver be engaged in a reciprocal interaction. Once this is
accomplished, the steps for evaluating the (service) robot
may be completed according to the CCVSD approach (see
Table 1). In so doing, the roboticist and/or robot ethicist
involved in the evaluation will be able to label the recip-
rocal interaction according to the scenarios presented
above.
By specifying ‘retrospective’ evaluations I aim to indi-
cate that one has a robot prototype in mind that they want
to study. The goal then is to understand what the original
practice was that the robot is integrated into. From this, the
evaluation can take place. Current service robots in the
research and design stages that fit the bill so to speak
include but are not limited to: Jibo the personal service
robot in the home for reading children bedtime stories,
Autom the diet assist robot, assistive locator robots in a
store (e.g. OshBot), server robots in a restaurant (‘‘Me-
chanic masterchef’’ 2013; News 2014), pizza delivery
robots (DRU from Dominoes), and milking robots to name
a few. This list is only sure to increase in number in the
coming years as the technology thrives and further devel-
ops. The next step will be to engage in systematic and
comprehensive evaluations of these robots to show how
CCVSD is applicable and what results its application
yields. This will be the goal of the future work of this
author.
When using the approach in a prospective manner the
aim of the steps is to identify a care practice in which there
exists a need for the assistance of a robot and to inten-
tionally design it in a way that results in either scenario ‘i’
or ‘ii’ presented above. For the former, the example I
presented in an earlier work, the wee-bot robot, shows how
the robot ought to be designed to interact with the human
user, the nurse, so as to maintain the presence, attentive-
ness, competence and responsibility of the nurse (van
Wynsberghe 2013). The manner in which this is accom-
plished is through ensuring a reciprocal interaction
between robot and nurse, i.e. that the nurse intentionally
give the robot certain cues to allow the robot to move on to
another portion of its task and/or to complete its task.
Also of particular interest will be the instance in which
the creation of a robot results in a new care practice. In this
instance a practice may not be considered as such until the
robot is created and used. A robot used to guide an elderly
person throughout a shopping mall or grocery store
(Robovie II—the personal robotic shopper 2009) could
appear to be the establishment of a new care practice
provided that the robot and the person it is escorting are
able to interact in a reciprocal manner. In other words, one
would imagine such a case only when the robot has enough
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AI to engage as a reciprocal partner through verbal, audi-
tory, visual and/or other cues. The CCVSD approach can
also be used for evaluating these robots but a comparison
between practices will not be possible. In this instance the
practice itself can be evaluated using the moral elements in
so far as they are a tool for evaluating a care practice on its
own.
Conclusion
Within the coming years it should not be a surprise to
encounter either a personal or a professional service robot
in our homes and/or our work places. Since these robots
will function in the unpredictable, unstructured environ-
ment that humans live and work in, they demand ethical
reflection. I argue that the ethical evaluation (at least for the
present time) should be specific to the robot (its capabilities
and appearance) and the practice within which is has been
placed. More specifically I mean to suggest that features of
both the robot and the practice will help to decide if that
robot is good or bad for the practice at hand. Thus, we may
engage in the same kind of ethical evaluation for profes-
sional and personal service robots as we do for healthcare
robots.
The approach created specifically for robots in health-
care remains to date the only one of its kind to systemat-
ically evaluate care robots and provide insights for
ethicists, designers and policy makers. Given that robots
are already in use and continue to be developed for con-
texts’ outside healthcare it would seem to be of great
benefit to show that CCVSD may also be used to evaluate
robots outside of the healthcare domain. The normative
foundations for CCVSD come from its reliance on the care
ethics tradition and in particular the use of care practices
for: (i) structuring the analysis and (ii) determining the
values of ethical import. To apply CCVSD outside of
healthcare one must show that the robot has been integrated
into a care practice. Accordingly, the practice into which
the robot is to be used must be assessed and shown to meet
the conditions of a care practice. The two conditions are as
follows, that: (1) The practice be a response to the needs of
another, and (2) The care giver and care receiver be
engaged in a reciprocal interaction. Provided these condi-
tions are met, the (service) robot can then be evaluated
according to the steps of the CCVSD approach (see
Table 1).
This work was meant as a preliminary study investi-
gating the applicability of the approach for robots outside
of care, namely service robots. By investigating the foun-
dations of the approach I hoped to show why it may be
applicable for service robots. Added to this my aim was to
provide initial reflections regarding the impact on the
reciprocal interaction between care giver and care receiver
and to use current robot prototypes as examples of robots
that can and cannot be evaluated according to the CCVSD
approach. This work was not intended to be an exhaustive
evaluation of one or more service robots; rather, it argued
that service robots can, and should, be evaluated using the
CCVSD approach.
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